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Abstract
   This paper analyzes how tasks are assigned in organizations. Tasks can be allocated 
vertically between a principal and an agent, or laterally among agents. The resulting organi-
zational job design determines how many tasks are delegated to agents, and how the agents' 
tasks are divided among them. In the framework ofthe standard principal-agent relationship 
with moral hazard, it is shown that (i) an incentive consideration causes the principal to group 
a broad range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of 
them specialize injust one task; and (ii) the principal may choose to delegate all the tasks in 
order to mitigate a conflicting incentive problem with agents.
Job design, delegation, and cooperation 
A principal-agent analysis*
Hideshi Itoh 
Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
October 1993
1. Introduction 
    One of the first things an entrepreneur must decide, upon forming a business organization 
as an owner-manager by hiring subordinates, is how to allocate tasks among them. There 
are two relevant questions. First, which of the tasks are delegated to the subordinates and 
which are left under the entrepreneur's control? The answer to this question determines 
delegation of decision making in the organization. Second, how are those tasks delegated 
to the subordinates to be divided among them? The answer determines the division of labor 
among the subordinates. The issue of job design is important in inter-firm relationships as well. 
A manufacturer and its parts suppliers must specify their functional roles: Do suppliers only 
produce parts following the drawings provided by the manufacturer, or does the manufacturer 
permit the suppliers themselves to design their parts? Does the manufacturer make each 
supplier specialize in a narrow range of components (e.g., produce only seat cover) or make a 
supplier responsible for various components (e.g., produce the entire seat)? It is an important 
step toward theories of organizational structures to understand both vertical and lateral job 
structuring. 
    This paper analyzes the job design problem of the owner-manager or the manufacturer 
in a simple principal-agent model with moral hazard. The _ party who is a residual claimant 
and is entitled to allocate tasks and design contractual terms is called a "principal." At the 
beginning, no party possesses relevant information or expertise privately. Therefore, if the 
    Correspondence to: Hideshi Itoh, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, 
Kyoto 606-01, Japan 
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principal could perform all the tasks by herself, she would choose to do so, and the job design 
problem would not be an issue. I instead assume that forming an organization is inevitable: 
The principal must hire "agents" and allocate some of the tasks to them because, for example, 
her attention is limited. In contrast to the standard principal-agent relationship, however, 
the principal can choose to leave some of the activities under her control. This paper hence 
extends the analysis of job design among agents by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Itoh 
(1991, 1992) to include not only lateral but also vertical task assignment problems-' 
    The paper also studies implications ofthe use of aggregate p rformance measures for the 
job design problem. Each activity may not be measured separately, oreven it can, direct ob-
servation of performance at each task is often subjective, and hence unlikely to be contractible. 
However, some objective aggregate p rformance measures are likely to be available. I hence 
assume that there is a verifiable and "informative" signal measuring joint performance in the 
organization while performance at each task cannot be measured separately. In other words, 
the principal and the agents engage in team production. In the future, the analysis in the 
current paper should be extended to incorporate subjective individual performance measures 
in a model of the three-tier hierarchy of principal-supervisor-agents. Since the focus of the 
paper is on the effects of objective aggregate p rformance measures, a model of the two-tier 
hierarchy isused throughout.' 
    Two results are presented in the framework described above. First, when the principal 
delegates all the tasks to the agents, an incentive consideration causes her to group a broad 
range of tasks into an agent's job rather than hire multiple agents and make each of them 
specialize in just one task. In the model, the activities are cost substitutes and hence when 
they can be perfectly observed, specialization is better. It is shown that when the activities 
,can .only be observed imperfectly, through team performance measures, the principal prefers 
non-specialization under sufficiently small degrees of cost substitutability. The notion that 
labor-force specialization leads to efficiency, which has been well known in economics since 
Adam Smith, has been recently challenged in practice: In the best performance projects in 
the world automobile industry, task assignments among engineers tend to be broad both in 
  1 Riordan and Sappington (1987) analyze a
.vertical task assignment problem in an adverse 
selection model. 
  2 However, the qualitative results of the paper continue to hold when contractible p rfor-
mance measures at each task are available. See Itoh (1993) for details. 
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breadth of activities and in range of components (Clark and Fujimoto, -1991; Womack, et al., 
1990); The high performance of Japanese manufacturing is often attributed. to the capabilities 
of workers who are responsible for not only routine operations but also unusual operations 
such as those dealing with changes in product mix and labor mix, and with problems due 
to machine breakdown and defective products (Koike, 1991). The paper. shows that such 
broad job structuring is desirable from the incentive viewpoint even without technological 
complementarity among tasks. 
    The second result is that under some conditions, the principal, when she must allocate 
some tasks to agents, chooses to delegate all the tasks in order to mitigate a conflicting 
incentive problem with the agents: Delegation is not a source of incentive problems but it can 
be an incentive device in addition to financial rewards. Such a mode of "complete delegation" 
is more desirable as the aggregate performance is easier to measure or the agents have more 
discretion about their work so as to be more responsive toincentives. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2. The 
results are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, the possibility of task sharing among agents 
is discussed. Section 5is concluding remarks.
2. The model 
   The model is a simplified version of the one in Itoh (1993), which in turn utilizes the 
tractable linear agency model developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1991). A principal 
owns a production process that consists of two tasks t = 1, 2. Suppose that the benefit from 
production is of the specific form x = a1 + a2 + E where at > 0 represents unobservable action 
(effort) at task t and c the error term. The principal and all the agents hired by the principal 
have identical information. All of them believe that c is Normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance a2 > 0. For simplicity, I assume that x is the only available information for 
contracting. This assumption can be dropped. For example, x and the actual benefit may be 
different. A monitoring variable for each task may be available and, though unlikely, may be 
contractible.3 In this paper, I focus on the extreme case in order to highlight the effects of the 
use of team performance measures. 
 3 These cases are analyzed in Itoh (1993). 
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     A contract specifies payments oagents and a task allocation mode. The principal cannot 
  perform both tasks by herself, and hence she must hire at least one agent o allocate tasks. 
  The principal has four feasible task, allocation modes. (i) Partial delegation: The principal 
  delegates task 1 (or task 2) to an agent and performs task 2 (task 1, respectively) by herself. 
  (ii) Non-specialized complete delegation: The principal delegates both tasks to an agent. (iii) 
  Specialized complete delegation: The principal hires two agents called agent 1 and agent 2 and 
  delegates task t to agent (t = 1, 2). Let w(x) be the payments o the agent under partial 
  delegation ornon-specialized complete delegation, and wt(x) be the payments oagent under 
  specialized complete delegation. 
     The party who is assigned a task incurs private cost. When the agent performs both 
  tasks under non-specialized complete delegation, his cost is C(a1,.a2 ). Under the other modes, 
 the party who performs task 1 (task 2) bears cost C1(a1) C(a1, 0) (respectively C2(a2) :_ 
  C(0, a2 )).4 To obtain explicit solutions, I assume that the cost function is quadratic and of 
  the form 
                      C(al, a2) = 2ca2 + 2cat + bca1a2 
  where c> 0 and b E [07 1]. Parameter b epresents a degree ofcost substitutability between 
  two tasks. When b = 0, two tasks are independent i  the sense that the choice of a1 does not 
  affect hat of a2 even under non-specialization. When b > 0, increasing effort at task 1 raises 
  the marginal cost of effort at task 2. When b = 1, two activities are perfect substitutes, and 
  the cost depends only on the total effort a1 + a2. Note that two tasks are symmetric n the 
  cost function for all b since C1(a) = C2 (a) = 2ca2. Two modes of partial delegation are thus 
  indifferent, and I only consider the partial delegation mode in which the agent performs task 
  1.5 Let d E { p, n, s } represent a ask allocation mode: d = p implies partial delegation, d = n 
  non-specialized complete delegation, and d = s specialized complete delegation. 
     The principal is risk neutral. There is a pool of agents who are risk averse with preferences 
  represented by the exponential utility function: When an agent's income (payment received 
  minus cost of action) is I, his utility is - exp{-rI} where r > 0 is the coefficient ofabsolute 
  risk aversion. The principal selects agents with identical coefficient ofabsolute risk aversion 
    4 I am assuming that task sharing is impossible, because, for example, ach task requires 
  use of a machine that cannot be operated by both agents at the same time. See Section 4for 
  discussion on task sharing. 
    5 See Itoh (1993) for the analysis of asymmetric cases. 
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and identical productivity, and their reservation wages are assumed to be zero. 
   I assume that the payment schemes take the linear form w(x) = ax`' + -y under mode 
d E { p, n }, and wt (X) = atx + yt for t = 1, 2 under d = s.6 Given a task allocation mode, the 
principal chooses the share parameters a or (a1, a2) to maximize the certainty equivalent of
joint surplus ubject o incentive compatibility constraints.7 The certainty equivalent ofjoint 
surplus is given as follows:
            al + a2 - Ci (a1) - C2 (a2) - 2 ra2a2 under d= p; 
            a1 + a2 - C(a1, a2) - 2 rat a2 under d= n; 
            a1 + a2 - C, (a,) - C2 (a2) - 2 ra2a2 - 2 ra2a2 under d= s. 
The incentive compatibility constraints are given as follows: Under d = p, a - Ci (a1) = 0 for 
the agent and (1 - a) - C' (a2) = 0 for the principal; Under d = n, a - Ca, (a,, a2) 0 and 
a - Cat (a1, a2) = 0; And under d= s, a1 - C1(a1) = 0 and a2 - C2 (a2) = 0. 
   Let a* be the optimal share parameter under mode d. Note that because ofsymmetry, 
the optimal share rates for agent 1and for agent 2are equal under the specialized delegation 
mode. The comparison among task allocation modes i based on the certainty equivalent 
of joint surplus under (d, a*): If (d, a*) yields higher joint surplus than (d', a*,), then the 
principal prefers to choose the former than the latter. The optimal task allocation mode is d 
such that the joint surplus i the highest under (d, a* ).
r
3. The results 
   I start with the analysis of division of labor between agents. Suppose that the principal 
delegates both tasks. The question is whether she assigns one agent to both tasks or hires two 
agents each of which performs a distinct task. The optimal share rates under d = n . and d = s 
are calculated as 
                    * 
__ 2 1 
                an 2 
+ (1 + S)ra2c and as = 1 + ra2c* 
 6 See Itoh (1993) for a justification of this assumption. It is possible to show that the 
model presented here is regarded as a reduced form of a dynamic model as in Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987), in which optimal incentives are provided with linear contracts. 
   The fixed components y and (71,72) simply play a role of surplus transfer between the 
principal and the agents. 
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   Fix parameters (c, r, 01" ). When b = 1 (two activities are perfect substitutes), one has 
an = as. This does not imply that the optimal efforts are equal under two modes, however. 
Under non-specialization, thetotal effort satisfies an = c(ai + a2) while under specialization, 
for each task t, as = cat. It is therefore clear that d = s attains higher joint surplus than d = n. 
Next suppose b = 0. Then an > as. By the incentive compatibility constraints, the efforts 
chosen by the agent under contract (n, as) are equal to the optimal efforts under (s, as ). 
However, the joint surplus is higher under the former contract because of the additional risk 
premium term under d = s. The joint surplus is hence higher under (n, an) than under (s, as ) 
when b = 0. The optimal value of joint surplus under d n is decreasing in b since an is 
decreasing in b and the joint surplus is increasing in a. Since under d = s the optimal value 
of joint surplus is independent of b, I have shown the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. Fix parameters (c, r) 012 ). Then there xists b E (0, 1) such that for all. b < b, 
the principal prefers non-specialized complete delegation tospecialized complete delegation.
   The important insight from this result is that an incentive problem causes the principal 
to assign an agent to a broad range of tasks. If actions were publicly observable, the principal 
would never choose to assign an agent to both tasks for all b > 0. However, when actions 
are unobservable, for all values of c, r, and o.2, non-specialization attains higher surplus for 
sufficiently small degrees of cost substitutability. The advantage in technology will be traded 
off against he incentive consideration. Note that no technological complementarity is assumed 
here since b > 0. 
   Next consider the optimality of delegating both tasks. The optimal share rate under 
partial delegation is given by 
1 
                                   ap- 2
+rQ2c* 
It is always smaller than an and as. The underlying logic is evident from the incentive 
compatibility constraints. Under partial delegation, there is a conflicting interest between 
the principal and the agent. Once the payment scheme has been set, both the principal and 
the agent must be given incentives, and increasing the agent's share reduces the principal's 
motivation. Such a conflict disappears once both tasks are allocated to agents. However, 
delegating more tasks accompany more responsibility. Comparing the joint surplus under 
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three modes leads to the following result.8 
Proposition 2. For all b E [0,1], if c, r, and .2 are sufficiently small, a complete delegation 
mode, whether specialized ornon-specialized, is preferred to partial delegation. 
   The proposition shows that there is a case where the principal prefers delegating both tasks 
to agents, in order to mitigate the conflicting incentive problem. Other than monetary rewards, 
delegation oftasks can be an additional incentive device. However, complete delegation has 
its own cost. Agents are given more responsibility and hence must incur more risk. 
   The important parameters that affect he optimal task allocation are a2 and c. Variance 
01 2 represents he difficulty of measuring joint performance. If a2 - * 0, both modes of complete 
delegation can attain the first best since the optimal share rate approaches to one, while the 
conflicting interest between the principal and the agent prevents he organization with partial 
delegation from achieving the first best (ap --> 2 ). On the other hand, if the team performance 
is hard to measure,: complete delegation is costly in terms of risk sharing, and hence keeping 
a task under the principal's control attains higher joint surplus. 
   Parameter c is the slope of the marginal cost of effort when performing just one task. This 
parameter has an important interpretation. The inverse c-1 represents he responsiveness of 
effort, to incentives at each task under partial delegation orspecialized complete delegation: 
From the incentive compatibility constraints, under partial delegation (delegating task 1), 
aa1 /oa aa2 /O(1 - a) = c-1, and under specialized delegation, aal /Oa1 = N2 /49a2 = c-1. 
The effort. responsiveness is a little different under non-specialized complete delegation, and 
is,given by aa1 /, ea. = 49a2/0a,= [(1 + b)c]-1. Under either mode, the share parameter is
increasing in c-1: Stronger incentives are provided as agents are more able to respond, to them. 
And the effort responsiveness could be controlled. For example, as Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(199.1) analyze, providing more freedom to agents by allowing their "private activities", can 
increase the agents' responsiveness and work as an incentive instrument. More generally, 
the principal could invest in work conditions to reduce the marginal cost of effort: the cost 
function could be C(a1, a2, a3) with Ca3 < 0 and Cata3 < 0 for t = 1, 2 where a3 is the level of 
investment. Therefore, the proposition implies that when the principal can raise the agents.' 
discretion about their work or improve their work conditions, more delegation of tasks and 
 s The derivation of the result is. straightforward and not instructive, and thus omitted. 
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more intense incentives are likely to follow.
4. Task overlap and cooperation 
   In the previous analysis, it has been assumed that task overlap is not feasible: If two 
agents are hired, each of them specializes in a different task and does not exert effort to the 
other task. However, it is often observed that a group of tasks is assigned to a group of 
workers and they cooperate at each task within the group. Is there a merit of task overlap 
and cooperation? 
   The possibility of task sharing has been studied under the assumption that performance at 
each task is measured separately. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that it is never optimal 
for two agents to be jointly responsible for any task when there is a continuum of tasks and 
they are perfect substitutes. Itoh (1991) shows that there are cases in which joint responsibility 
'i
s optimal. His sufficient condition is not satisfied if activities are perfect substitutes in the 
cost function. However, when aggregate p rformance measures are used for contracting, task 
sharing is optimal even if tasks are "almost" perfect substitutes. 
   To see this, suppose that a is so high that specialized complete delegation is optimal. 
Let ai be the optimal effort by agent 1 at task 1, that satisfies the incentive compatibility 
constraint as - ca* = 0. Now suppose that agent 1 can exert effort to task 2 as well. Let 
h1 be agent 1's effort at task 2. Suppose that technology is of the specific linear form x = 
a1 + a2 + h1 + E. Fix as and consider a pair of (a1, h1) that satisfies the new incentive 
compatibility constraints: as (a1, h1) = 0 and as -- Chi (a1, h1) = 0. The solution 
satisfies a1 + h1 = 2[(1 + S)c]-1 as > ai for b < 1. Thus by allowing task sharing, higher joint 
surplus can be attained. This result follows because the share parameter for team performance 
already provides an incentive for an agent o exert effort o the other agent's task: There is 
no fixed cost to provide incentives for new activities in contrast to the case where the benefit 
from each task is measured separately as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Itoh (1991). 
   The analysis of task sharing and cooperation is more interesting when the principal has an 
alternative incentive scheme that promotes "competition" via use of relative performance eval-
uation. When performance at each task can be measured separately and there is a systematic 
uncertainty so that individual measures are positively correlated, relative performance evalu-
ation is valuable. However, since relative performance evaluation provides each agent with an 
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  incentive to reduce the others' performance, it is essential .to preclude task sharing- (Lazear, 
  :1989). Which is better, preventing task overlap and using relative performance evaluation, or 
  allowing task sharing and using joint responsibility? This question has been analyzed in Itoh 
  (1992): Cooperation should be promoted if the correlation coefficient is sufficiently small. 
     An extension fthe model in this paper also leads to, a circumstance in which relative 
  performance is used in the optimal contract. Suppose that here are three tasks t= 1, 2, 3 and 
  two team performance m asures x1and x2, which are given by x1 = a1 + a3 + Ei and x2 = 
  a2 + a3 + E2. The Normal noise terms c1 and E2 are assumed, to be stochastically independent. 
  Tasks 1 and 2 are "local" in the sense that each of them affects just one performance m asure 
  while task 3 is "global" in that both measures are affected by action at task.3. For example, 
  task 1 and task 2 are sales activities atterritories 1 and 2, respectively, and x1 and x2 are actual 
  sales at those territories. Task 3 is advertising activities that affect the sales at both regions. 
  Suppose that agent A is assigned task 1, agent B task 2, and the principal performs task 3. 
  The agents' compensations are given by the linear schemes WA(x1,x2) = a1x1 + a2x2 + ao 
 and WB(x1, X2) = /31x1 +/32x2 +,30-
     This is the situation analyzed by Carmichael (1983). As he shows in his model, here the 
 optimal share rates atisfy a1 > 0, a2 < 0, /3i < 0, )3 > 0, I ai) > (a2 ~, and 1,Q2 1 >. `l /3i 1 
 To see this., note that the incentive compatibility constraints are given by a1 - C{ (a1) = 0, 
 02,- C2 (a2) = 0, and {1 - a1 - ~1) + ( 1 - a2 .- /32) - C3 (a3) = 0 where Ct(at) is the private 
 cost. of effort at, task t. The first two equations are the incentive compatibility -constraints 
 for the agents, the last one for, the principal who is assigned task 3. To provide incentives 
 for the agents,. a1 > 0 and /32 > 0 must. hold. This reduces the principal's incentive at task 
 3. However, since _a2. and /31 come into the last equation only, they are utilized to raise the 
 principal's incentive, and hence they are negative at the optimum. 
     Despite the stochastic ndependence between x1 and x2, the agents are rewarded based on 
 not only the absolute performance xt but also by "relative performance" x1- X2. And again it 
 is better for the principal to restrict ask sharing between the agents. However, the principal 
 may benefit by delegating task 3 to the agents and motivating task sharing via assignment of
 joint responsibility, that is, at > 0 and /3t > 0 for t = 1, 2. Since the exact mode of delegation 
 in this setting is hard to specify (e.g., How do the agents determine action at task 3? How 
 are they going to share the cost of effort?) and the analysis complicated, I only suggest the 
9
possibility and leave rigorous analysis for future research. 
   Note that delegating the global task to agents may be optimal because the principal can 
control the agents' choice through team performance measures. If the role of the global task is 
to reduce the cost of effort (e.g., improving work conditions), delegation is never optimal. To 
see this, modify technology to x1 = a1 + E1 and x2 = a2 + E2. The role of task 3 is to reduce 
the costs of effort at tasks 1 and 2: The cost functions are written as C1(a1, a3), C2(a2, a3), 
and C3(a3), and satisfy aCt/aa3 < 0, a2Ct/(aataa3) < 0, and C3 > 0 for t = 1, 2. Suppose 
that the agents, when assigned task 3, select a3 to maximize the certainty equivalent of their 
joint surplus, that is, to minimize C, (a,, a3) + C2(a2, a3) + C3(a3). It is then never optimal to 
delegate task 3 to the agents, since their choice of a3 ignores the effects of a3 on the incentive 
compatibility constraints. The principal has no way to control their choice of action at task 3.
i
5. Conclusion 
   Job design is an important decision for organizations. It determines division of labor and 
delegation pattern of decision making. This paper analyzed those two aspects of job design 
simultaneously, and showed that important insights are obtained from incentive considerations: 
there is an incentive reason for grouping a broad range of tasks into an agent's job, and 
delegation of all the tasks to a subordinate may be adopted as an incentive instrument. 
   The paper focused on the use of verifiable and informative team performance measures. 
Introducing subjective measures for each activity into the model by extending to a three-
tier hierarchy is one direction for future research. The paper also adopted the "complete 
contracting" approach: Decision making authority was assumed to be a well specified notion, 
written into a contract through task assignment. However, delegated authority is often vague 
in scope and entitlement: Who has authority about what? The analysis of delegated authority 
in an "incomplete contracting" framework will be important, and hopefully the current paper 
offers a useful benchmark.
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